13 thoughts on “The Content of Saving Faith (The Dialogue)”

1. Okay Jim,

   Thanks for joining in this experiment! (I’m saying this by faith…since I’m posting first!)

   So, basically you have a number claims here that I don’t yet buy (perhaps because I don’t understand them). Here they are:

   Revelation is comprised of propositions, to be sure, but it is much more than propositions; it typically invites responses

   You can’t boil faith down to “knowability” or “persuasion” alone. There has to be a component of voluntary “acceptance” of God’s grace that involves the will (Rom 5:17…)

   the “transaction” involves an object of faith, which is the Person of Messiah

   a basis for salvation, which is the death and Resurrection of that Person

   a result, which is “eternal life.”

   All of which leads to your summary:

   So when I think of “saving faith” I think of trusting in an object (the promised Messiah) for a result (life after death, forever). The basis by which that promise can be guaranteed is the atoning death and resurrection of the Son of God.

   So, one-at-a-time:

   Revelation is comprised of propositions, to be sure, but it is much more than propositions; it typically invites responses

   Actually, I don’t think (do I?) that revelation is anything more than propositions. Webster’s defines proposition as, “an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false.” The Bible is all and only language. It certainly has unique power and ability (Romans 1:16; Hebrews 4:12), but at the essential level it is simply propositions. Now, these propositions do invite responses; but a response needs the proposition to ‘respond to’. Indeed, ‘believe, doubt, or deny’ are the various ways we may respond…which underscores the issue. The Bible would be more than propositions IF a specific response was required and always occurred. Instead, it is a set of propositions we may buy, consider, or reject. If a Bible sits there unread, it’s propositions still exist…but no responses exist because the propositions aren’t being read (kind of a tree falls in the forest thingy!).

   You can’t boil faith down to “knowability” or “persuasion” alone. There has to be a component of voluntary “acceptance” of God’s grace that involves the will (Rom 5:17…)

   Why not? How do you draw a distinction between believing I’m saved and believing I accepted salvation? Your statement of ‘acceptance’ is just a proposition you believe to be true; isn’t it? Did you accept it or believe it? Accept can mean ‘to receive willingly’ or ‘to recognize as true’ (from here on out I’m referencing Webster’s unless otherwise noted). Volition-in-faith seems to me to be a bit dependent on an assumption that conscious volition is a necessary step in believing (seems like a circular argument); an assumption that really needs to be proved for me to believe it. People believe things all the time ‘in an instant’ without engaging any choice at all (or we at least can’t measure the choice to believe)…in fact, that is the very nature of deception (1 Tim 2:14). How we come to believe something is one of the great theological/philosophical mysteries…but what believing means is not…it is persuasion, being convinced of something (a proposition), coming to a conclusion [“By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac, and he who had received the promises offered up his only begotten son, of whom it was said, “In Isaac your seed shall be called,” concluding that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead, from which he also received him in a figurative sense.” (Hebrews 11:17-19, NKJV) ].

   On volition, by the way, there is more to think about. If I can choose to ‘accept’ something to be true, then I can choose to accept anything to be true. Yet, I really can’t choose to believe anything. I can’t choose to believe I’m a woman, tall, a closet Hindu, etc. I simply believe other things, I’m persuaded.

   Also, I do not understand how Romans 5:17 demonstrates that faith involves the will…?

   the “transaction” involves an object of faith, which is the Person of Messiah

   At times the text says believe in Him and at times the text says believe that _________. I’m not sure the ‘object’ of faith really holds up compared to ‘propositions’ to believe. Frankly, how would you know that He is the Messiah (or what that means) without believing a variety of propositions FIRST? Indeed, what you say here about an ‘object of faith’ is actually a proposition, which I don’t yet believe. Yet, if you believe all the propositions, then you also believe in the object.

   a basis for salvation, which is the death and Resurrection of that Person

   Just because it is a (the?) basis, why does that mean it cannot be the means of salvation as well? We are saved by faith in something (propositions / object / person / promise…which is a proposition). Saying it is a basis, while true, doesn’t explain why it is not also the actual ‘object’ of faith that results in our salvation.

   a result, which is “eternal life.”

   While this is true as to the result of saving faith, it is clearly not the only expression of what the result of saving faith is called. For example, the result of saving faith is also salvation. Saved from what? Guilt? Sin? An eternity apart from God? If ‘eternal life’ is accepted as the only expression of the result of saving faith, then the arguments are unfairly (in my opinion) and narrowly focused on passages with that term in it.
   There is an exhausting number of passages that mention these things and more. Mark 3:29 says, “”but he who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is subject to eternal condemnation”—” (Mark 3:29, NKJV) or “but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin”—” (Mark 3:29, ESV) It is unavoidable that forgiveness is the basis for an eternal acceptance; so, it seems to stand to reason that we may just as rightly speak of forgiveness as the result or outcome of our faith…and, the saving of our souls (1 Peter 1:9) as a fine description of the story.

   So, as to your summary:

   So when I think of “saving faith” I think of trusting in an object (the promised Messiah) for a result (life after death, forever). The basis by which that promise can be guaranteed is the atoning death and resurrection of the Son of God.

   I appreciate these propositions that you believe, however, it appears you think the basis of your belief is superfluous. If this is true, it does sort of put you in the position of believing the cross is an unnecessary (but useful if known) bit of information. And, that whether or not one knows the ‘basis by which that promise is guaranteed’ (the death and resurrection as you describe) doesn’t matter as long as he believes the promise.

   As for me…I believe the 2nd, 3rd and 4th points of the FGA Covenant:

   The sole means of receiving the free gift of eternal life is faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, whose substitutionary death on the cross fully satisfied the requirement for our justification.
   Faith is a personal response, apart from our works, whereby we are persuaded that the finished work of Jesus Christ has delivered us from condemnation and guaranteed our eternal life.
   Justification is the act of God to declare us righteous when we believe in Jesus Christ alone.

   All of this is why ‘content’ is an issue regardless. You and I both have content…but what is the content that is the instrumentality of our reception of forgiveness, eternal life, and/or the salvation of our souls? Another way to ask it is, “What do we NOT have to believe in order to be saved?” Whatever is left over is the message we should be sharing.

   Grace and truth,

   Fred

   P.S. Sorry for the length…just focus in on anything you’d like…we don’t need to overwhelm onlookers or ourselves!

   1. Jim,

      Sorry, I need to bring this one up to a higher level.

      You said,

      God-speech “does” things more than inform or convince or persuade. Revelation can also offend, convict, humiliate, encourage, mandate, exhort, warn, shame, and condemn, among others. While these different so-called speech-acts can be described by propositions, they are not the same as propositions and do not function as mere truth claims.

      Jim, this is simply untrue (it is sort of a language and logic trick…calling something a speech-act doesn’t make it the thing it is named…see William Shakespeare on roses).

      Revelation ONLY offends (offend, convict, humiliate, encourage, mandate, exhort, warn, shame, and condemn) when it is believed. We call this the convicting or enlightening work of the Spirit, but it is fundamentally about faith first.

      Ephesians says this:

      “having the eyes of your hearts enlightened, that you may know what is the hope to which he has called you, what are the riches of his glorious inheritance in the saints, and what is the immeasurable greatness of his power toward us who believe, according to the working of his great might that he worked in Christ when he raised him from the dead and seated him at his right hand in the heavenly places,” (Ephesians 1:18-20, ESV)

      Notice that He works in those who believe.

      The truth is that people are ACTING on PROPOSITIONS that they believe. Others, who don’t believe them, don’t act on them. We act in faith, but it isn’t a faith-act in the sense you are claiming.

      The proof is that people can indeed believe a proposition, but not act (see James 2, or Chapter 4 of Back to Faith, Fred Lybrand).

      If people must act consistently with what they believe, then there COULD NOT EXIST such a thing a hypocrite.

      ‘Speech-acts’ cannot really accurately be called propositions. The proposition is the proposition (which is believed), AND the action is the action (which is done because the proposition is believed).

      Thanks,

      FRL

      1. Well, Fred, your post is kind of out of order in our thread, but I’ll make some brief comments here and then resume the discussion in a more detailed reply to your other response below.

         I’m glad you chose this statement to excerpt from my last reply. It really does get to the core of the “language” and “truth” issue I am trying to clarify. And you and I are not using terms the same way at all. So, let me just try to clarify my use of the terms that I believe you have misconstrued:

         You said The truth is that people are ACTING on PROPOSITIONS that they believe. Others, who don’t believe them, don’t act on them. We act in faith, but it isn’t a faith-act in the sense you are claiming.

         This has elements that are consistent with what I am saying, but I’m saying more than that: First, much of what God says is not in the form of propositions, and you have quoted my above examples to illustrate how that speech can “do” stuff to people other than persuading them that something is true. A common example in Scripture is the command: We are not being asked to “believe” a command, we are being asked to obey it. One can dispute whether the person making the command has the authority to do so, but that is distinct from obeying or refusing to obey. Second, you use the term “faith-act” which should not be confused with “speech-act.” What you are calling “faith-act” is what I am calling obedience in response to speech-act.

         You also said:
         ‘Speech-acts’ cannot really accurately be called propositions.
         That depends on whether the speech-act is making a truth-claim or not. If it is making a truth-claim, it is a proposition and can either be believed or denied. The thing that this kind of speech-act “does” is to inform and/or persuade.

         If it is not a proposition or truth-claim, then such nonpropositional speech-acts can either be resisted or embraced, but it is a category mistake to claim that they must be believed or not believed. As I pointed out below in the example of David and Nathan: David’s anger and outrage over the lack of justice Nathan depicted in his story was exactly the response God intended in order to “set David up for the kill” with the ensuing proposition “Thou art the man.” Obviously, David “believed” Nathan’s story (which was only “true” by analogy), but the speech-act was intended to provoke outrage, not to persuade him of a truth-claim until Nathan’s concluding proposition. At that point, the issue was whether David would repent or not, so that does indeed relate directly to your final sentence above.

      2. Jim,

         I’m sorry for getting out of order, but we really have a fundamental issue that I don’t think we can get past. Allow me to get our readers caught up on some of the jargon involved in the conversation. Here’s the some of the lingo-basics according to Hawthorne, Martin, and Reid,

         1.5. Intentionality Approaches. There is a growing number of scholars who stress some type of intentionality approach, that is, a return to author and text as generating meaning. Prominent among these are E. D. Hirsch and his followers (e.g., W. Kaiser, E. Johnson) who see the author’s intention as the sole authentic meaning of the text. Hirsch sees two aspects in interpretation—meaning (linked to authorial intent) and significance (as the readers align themselves with the implications of the author’s meaning for the present). The former is never changing while the latter changes with the reader’s context.
         Others build more upon the later phase of L. Wittgenstein’s thought and J. Searle’s speech-act theory. Searle argues that the heart of interpretation theory is the notion that language is referential more than it is performative. The sentence is an intentional device that brings hearers into the proper arena so that they might apply the correct rules for recognizing the meaning of the utterance. His thesis is: “speaking a language is engaging in a (highly complex) rule-governed form of behaviour” (Searle 1969, 77, 80). K. Vanhoozer (1986, 91–92) notes four factors that guide interpretation: proposition (the data in the text), purpose (the reason communicated), presence (the form or genre of the message) and power (the illocutionary force of the message). He argues that the reader is ethically bound by the text to discover its intended message. Osborne (411–15) calls for a trialogue between author, text and reader. The reader recognizes the guiding presence of preunderstanding and tradition but seeks to place it in front of rather than behind the text, thus allowing the text to correct previous understanding if necessary. This is not done easily but is accomplished by studying past meaning (via historical-grammatical exegesis) and present interpretative possibilities (via the conclusions of competing reading communities). The key is to allow competing possibilities to drive the interpreter back to reexamine the text in a new and open way.
         Finally, A. C. Thiselton (597–619) has developed a comprehensive speech-act hermeneutic. Building upon Wittgenstein’s theory of language games and J. L. Austin’s understanding of performative-language functions, Thiselton argues that texts perform not only locutionary functions (propositional meaning) but also illocutionary acts (calling for commitment and action on the part of the reader). Thus meaning and significance are united in a single act of coming-to-understanding. The text not only communicates its meaning but demands response. While in some ways there is a pluralism of response as the biblical text communicates in many different reading situations, there is not polyvalence (plurality of meanings) in the strictest sense, for the text performs a transforming function, as readers are led to new horizons or life-worlds by the text. For Romans 3 this would involve not only Paul’s development of justification by faith, but also the sense in which the readers are called to experience this for themselves.

         Hawthorne, G. F., Martin, R. P., & Reid, D. G. (1993). Dictionary of Paul and his letters (390). Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press.

         Jim,

         Now, as I hate to say these things…I am an educated man as are you. I have a degree in literature, served time in law school, have further degrees from Dallas Theological Seminary and Phoenix Seminary…and have been reading, writing, and teaching for over 28 years; but all of this is turning into a mess. This isn’t helpful to the conversation. Are you with Thiselton, Hirsch (who has changed views I understand), Johnson, Kaiser, or Wittgenstein?

         Our conversation is really a simple discussion which academics has continued to embrangle. We are aiming at a very straight-forward conversation about the content of saving faith. Introducing concepts such as Searle’s speech-act actually takes us away from the point of the conversations.

         Just because something in language is describe as having a demand in it (such as a command) it doesn’t remove the propositional nature of it. At the very least you would agree that coming to acknowledge a command MUST BE predicated on accepting propositions. Here’s the basic idea of propositions (again Websters):

         1prop•o•si•tion ˌprä-pə-ˈzi-shən noun
         (14th century)
         1 a (1) : something offered for consideration or acceptance : proposal
         (2) : a request for sexual intercourse
         b : the point to be discussed or maintained in argument usually stated in sentence form near the outset
         c : a theorem or problem to be demonstrated or performed
         2 a : an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false
         b : the objective meaning of a proposition
         3 : something of an indicated kind 〈getting there is a tough proposition〉 〈the farm was never a paying proposition〉
         Merriam-Webster, I. (1996, c1993). Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary. Includes index. (10th ed.). Springfield, Mass., U.S.A.: Merriam-Webster.

         Further, a to propose means,

         pro•posed; pro•pos•ing
         [Middle English, from Middle French proposer, from Latin proponere (perfect indicative proposui) — more at propound]
         (14th century)
         intransitive verb
         1 : to form or put forward a plan or intention 〈man proposes, but God disposes〉
         2 obsolete : to engage in talk or discussion
         3 : to make an offer of marriage
         transitive verb
         1 a : to set before the mind (as for discussion, imitation, or action) 〈propose a plan for settling the dispute〉
         b : to set before someone and especially oneself as an aim or intent 〈proposed to spend the summer in Italy〉
         2 a : to set forth for acceptance or rejection 〈propose terms for peace〉 〈propose a topic for debate〉
         b : to recommend to fill a place or vacancy : nominate 〈propose them for membership〉
         c : to offer as a toast 〈propose the happiness of the couple〉
         — pro•pos•er noun

         Merriam-Webster, I. (1996, c1993). Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary. Includes index. (10th ed.). Springfield, Mass., U.S.A.: Merriam-Webster.

         The Bible sets before our minds propositions. That these propositions (which also amount to content or information) may be accepted, rejected, believed, doubted, followed, etc., are not relevant to our essential conversation on the Content of Saving Faith.

         Even if you think my question is wrong [What must one believe to be saved?], and would be better stated, “Who must one believe to be saved?”—I still would propose, “What must one believe about Who must one believe to be saved” still comes back to the nature of faith needing a proposition to understand and believe. In private correspondence I know that some are starting to propose that understanding is not necessary for faith (?).

         I, and all of us who are interested in sharing the gospel so others might join us in heaven [which no doubt includes you], have a really hard time with understanding the inordinate convolution such theological wranglings produce.

         It sounds like you are simply saying to all lay-folks that they must have deep linguistic insight into the nuances of the distinctions between propositional and non-propositional objects of faith. Further, appreciating speech-acts (specifically the illocutionary force of the message) and the essence of a command verses a promise, doesn’t actually help the conversation.

         FAITH is about believing something. What? Who?

         What about Who? Who said what that I need to believe it?

         I want to have this conversation, but we are so far afield now that very few people can follow. Please, can we go back to a simple conversation that is on the topic?

         Thanks brother,

         FRL

         P.S. I almost feel we need to start over. If it is necessary for the common person to understand your view of linguistics, hermeneutics, and the illocutionary force of the message, then it is no wonder people have been so frustrated in talking about something so simple. It was Wittgenstein who said (paraphrased), “If you can’t say it, you don’t know it.”

         Please don’t take what I’m saying a rude or ungracious or uninviting, but there is a level of plain language we can interact within. I know that there is nothing one can believe that doesn’t arise through foundational (at least) propositions. We still must believe in something and that something is true. It isn’t that I don’t have the time or patience; it is that I don’t see the value. Is there a way for you to keep this straight and simple?

2. Wow, Fred. Opened up the fire hose, there. I do think all of this needs to be sifted, but maybe I need to divvy it up into bite-sized chunks. I appreciate you clearing the playing field, and I hope we can stay on task—emotions have been a very potent force in recent FG discussions of these topics.

   I would like to make it clear that I intend at least some of these arguments to be provisional. That is, we may say something in a way that turns out to be “inaccurate” or at least less than precise, given the limitations of language, and the ideas may need to be repeatedly re-articulated until they “sound right.” I had a knock-down, drag-out with some folks on the definition of “believe” in the Greek and English that was just excruciating, and it took a third party to say something in a different way that finally settled me and my opponents down a bit. It was not something I could have anticipated, but it just had to go that long and involved a fair amount of pain. I don’t particularly enjoy pain, so I ask our “spectators” to be patient before jumping to conclusions about what we believe or who we supposedly affiliate with. The temptation for some to pigeonhole respondents has been distressing to me, and I will have low tolerance for engaging those who feel compelled to do so.

   I have an elder’s meeting tonight, so I’ll just try to tackle your first response first, which I believe (and I do reserve the right to be wrong) is the most important point of clarification and may pave the way for discussion of some of our other differences.

   I will interject initial comments in bold font after each italicized portion of your first response:

   Actually, I don’t think (do I?) that revelation is anything more than propositions. Webster’s defines proposition as, “an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false.” The Bible is all and only language. It certainly has unique power and ability (Romans 1:16; Hebrews 4:12), but at the essential level it is simply propositions.

   I radically disagree. My position is that this presupposition (“revelation is nothing more than propositions”) is inadequate and at the root of all sorts of ills in the science of hermeneutics. I believe Gordon Clark has fallen headlong into this error. Of all the authors who have shed light on this problem, Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?) is to me the clearest. I presented a paper on exactly this topic at ETS in 2006 which you can read here (or I can send you the updated version by e-mail which I’ve submitted for publication since then, just let me know). God-speech “does” things more than inform or convince or persuade. Revelation can also offend, convict, humiliate, encourage, mandate, exhort, warn, shame, and condemn, among others. While these different so-called speech-acts can be described by propositions, they are not the same as propositions and do not function as mere truth claims. Read Nathan’s story in his encounter with David in 2 Samuel, up to but not including the truth claim, “Thou art the man.” Now try to boil the story down to a truth claim Did God-speech in the mouth of Nathan “do” to David? You better believe it; he was mightily angered and offended, and the truth claim would have fallen flat unless revelation had first impacted him in the way it did.

   Now, these propositions do invite responses; but a response needs the proposition to ‘respond to’. Indeed, ‘believe, doubt, or deny’ are the various ways we may respond…which underscores the issue. The Bible would be more than propositions IF a specific response was required and always occurred. Instead, it is a set of propositions we may buy, consider, or reject. If a Bible sits there unread, it’s propositions still exist…but no responses exist because the propositions aren’t being read (kind of a tree falls in the forest thingy!).

   Revelation is meant to be heard by humans. The “intended response” dictates the scope of the possible kinds of “speech-act” that can reasonably be expected to elicit that particular response. If Nathan had confronted David with the proposition, “You have committed adultery and murder,” David would probably have denied or justified himself and very possibly had Nathan executed. However, Nathan’s “parable” of the rich man and the ewe-lamb cunningly angered David, such that when he finally heard the truth claim, he was shamed and humiliated to the point of repentance. Another kind of speech-act could have been tried, a command: “Repent, David!” That is not a truth claim, it is an imperative. Would that have “worked”? (BTW, this same kind of speech-act has in fact been tried occasionally on FG blogs, but to no avail; a different kind of speech-act will be required for us FGers to repent, apparently.)

   In sum, Biblical revelation is comprised of both propositional and non-propositional truth, and our response depends on how we hear that truth, for better or worse. I’d be interested in your take on my article, Fred.

   1. Jim,

      It looks like we are going to have a tough time with this topic. Here’s where you started:

      My position is that this presupposition (”revelation is nothing more than propositions”) is inadequate and at the root of all sorts of ills in the science of hermeneutics.
      
      I don’t know exactly how you are using the word ‘presupposition’ but it feels to me a bit condescending…that is to say that my view on faith isn’t actually something I concluded from the text or reflection, but instead I began with it as a presupposition to govern the way I think about things.

      Why exactly isn’t your statement that my statement is a presupposition…a presupposition itself?

      Here’s another example from what you stated:

      In sum, Biblical revelation is comprised of both propositional and non-propositional truth

      Why indeed is this statement of yours not a presupposition as well? I mean, at least half of it is, since biblical revelation is at least partially propositional.”

      I really don’t mean to sound contentious, but listen to how this sounds coming from me toward you in this same way—

      My position is that this presupposition (”Biblical revelation is comprised of both propositional and non-propositional truth”) is inadequate and at the root of all sorts of ills in the science of hermeneutics.

      Actually, I would say it is the root of all sorts of ills in logic and language, but you get my point.

      Are you presupposing your view, or did you conclude it from evidence (or at least find a way to support it from evidence)? Are presuppositions impossible to avoid?…and, if so…why use the word?

      Here is the heart of the problem:

      Fred’s view is a presupposition (that is radically bad).

      Jim’s view is not a presupposition (therefore [implied] it is radically good).

      Gracious me! I can’t get past the first two sentences. I’ve already lost the whole dialogue…and that just because I’m foolish enough to just start out with a good old fashioned flawed presupposition.

      How about explaining exactly why this is clearly a presupposition (never mind if it is actually at the heart of ‘all sorts of ills’ in hermeneutics).

      Yes, the word ‘claim’ (see Steven Toulmin) or ‘assertion’ or ‘view’ would have been better…but you didn’t choose those words.

      Please, first help me own up to the assertion, view, or claim that you make regarding revelation as propositions. There’s a good chance I’ll be cured.

      Of course, just because something is a presupposition, it doesn’t make it false.

      Thanks,

      FRL

      P.S. This turns out to be huge in the discussion on the content of saving faith. If faith isn’t about propositions, then the content of saving faith is irrelevant. On the other hand, if faith is in part about content, then the other (non-propositional part) is irrelevant to our discussion. We need only discuss the ‘necessary content’ of saving faith (which is needed in addition to the non-propositional part). Naturally, then the discussion is going to focus on whether or not ‘the cross’ is necessary (vital) in the propositional part of truth (saving truth). Of course, I do have the presupposition (I guess) that we must believe something true (whether propositional or not) in order to be saved.

      Oh…do email me the article you reference…I’d be glad to read it.

      1. I’m sorry, Fred, if that’s the way it came across (“condescending”); I don’t think I intended it that way, but you have given me cause to re-examine my motivation here.

         I don’t see presuppositions as either “bad” or “good,” only “inadequate” and in need of “adjustment” as we approach the text in a repeating cycle of induction and deduction. My own presuppositions are no more immune to this than anyone else’s. I’m not sure how “claim” or “view” or “assertion” would have been better, since I’m not sure we mean exactly the same thing by “presupposition.”

         I believe what I asserted, but a better way of saying it might have been: “To hold that Biblical revelation consists only of propositional truth creates significant problems in hermeneutics by virtue of the potential for excessively rationalistic use of logic and language.” Hence, your “PS” is on target; the issue of propositional and non-propositional truth is indeed “huge” in a discussion on COSF.

         I certainly am not denying the importance of propositional truth—it is crucial because we are created as rational beings who use logic and language to communicate. However, some of that communication is propositional and some is not. But, as you may be suggesting in the last sentence of your PS, truth can be communicated both propositionally and non-propositionally. In fact, depending on the truth to be communicated, a good painting or portrait may achieve the goal even better than propositions, as I have attempted below to demonstrate in the Nathan-David exchange in 2 Samuel.

         I’m sorry Fred, your point is well taken—I’ll definitely try to be a bit more sensitive. As I think through the logic of the rest of what I’ve tried to lay down in response to your initial reply, I’m not sure our differences here on epistemology are necessarily fatal for the rest of the discussion.

   2. Sorry Jim,

      The weekend pulled me away from the screen. Thanks for your understanding and clarification.

      I’m going to work through your paper soon, but let me just say that this may be pointing where the core of the problem is…non-propositional truth. What in the world is that really? That God is? Meaning that He isn’t a proposition, but rather is the one-and-only God of the universe, etc.? Well, the fact is that even though He isn’t a proposition…we DO KNOW ABOUT HIM through the propositions about Him in the Word. How about Jesus Christ’s love for us…it exists in His heart…yet, “Jesus loves me this I know for the Bible tells me so.”

      Of course, this means that there is still content to be had…take away the content and you take away the the faith (no object/subject). In fact, can you give me a non-propositional truth that I can understand or discern without FIRST believing the propositional truth about it? Any non-propositional ‘truth’ can only be gotten to through propositions…seems you are still really stuck (so tell me at least THE PROPOSITIONS you think one must believe to be saved).

      More pointedly, however, is another essential issue where you said,

      “To hold that Biblical revelation consists only of propositional truth creates significant problems in hermeneutics by virtue of the potential for excessively rationalistic use of logic and language.”

      Excessive rationalist use of logic and language? Boy, that doesn’t make sense (get the joke :-)!) You are not saying the ‘wrong use’ but rather that there is too much. Jim, this really sounds weirdly post-modern (or existential?); things I believe you deny.

      Is the problem that it is ‘excessively rationalistic’…or…that it is ‘actually irrational’? Faulty use of language and faulty use of logic I get…but too much?

      It also is a bit self-defeating since you are using language and logic to show that we shouldn’t use language and logic.

      It is impossible to excessively use language or logic concerning the Bible…but it is possible to be wrong in your use of language and logic.

      I suppose I need an example of something that is the fruit of “excessively rationalistic use of logic and language.”

      Help! But, I do need to be honest…I’ll either say “that makes sense” or “that doesn’t make sense”—which displays the conundrum; you are going to have to use language and logic to prove the point about it how logic and language shouldn’t be used (because it’s excessive).

      My only guess is that you believe that God speaks to us directly (of course, it needs to not be ‘speaks’ or it could be excessive…you get my point). God also tends to make sense…except on a few mysteries…which tends to make sense because He is God (beyond us).

      If you deny logic and language as adequate for God to convey truth…the the game is over and we can never get to a true answer because faith is not directed at propositional truth. There is a denial of ‘believe that…’. Which means, there isn’t a content to the gospel at all because the gospel is non-propositional.

      The convincing response will be a demonstration from God’s Word of a non-propositional truth. Bro, there is no way you can do this…I’ll admit I’m wrong if you can show me one (but I already know it is an impossibility because you MUST use logic and language to show me).

      I’m sort of a God says it and that settles it guy…which I’m guessing you reject (at least in part).

      God bless,

      FRL

      P.S. Quite related you said:

      In sum, Biblical revelation is comprised of both propositional and non-propositional truth, and our response depends on how we hear that truth, for better or worse.

      I suppose I also need to know how you propose one “hear” ( our response depends on how we hear that truth ) a non-propositional truth

      1. Yes, Fred, this is indeed the nitty-gritty of our different epistemic approaches to Scriptural truth. I will try to reply to each paragraph of your response without restating the whole thing.

         First main para. (“I’m going to work through…”):
         I agree entirely with what you say here.

         Second para. (“Of course this means…”):
         Here is an example of non-propositional truth that you can “feel” (or “discern,” if that word feels better). If I said to you, “Fred, go jump in the lake,” would you “believe” or “deny” what I just said? See, it’s a category mistake. So, what would be the “truth” in what I said? Obviously, “Jim is upset with Fred” (= a proposition, and that would be “true” but without the same “thrust” as my statement. Stuff like this is in the Bible all over the place (cf. e.g., Gal 5:12).

         So, what would be the “deeper truth” behind my statement (or whatever you label it)? You wouldn’t know until you pursued me with requests for further clarification as to why I reacted like that. You would “feel” my frustration and perhaps even my anger but you wouldn’t know the deeper truth until you actually respond to me. If you did respond, you might learn that my frustration is valid because of the way you came across to me and not because of anything propositional you said. Or you might learn that my frustration is totally illegitimate because someone told me you were disingenuous and had a “hidden agenda” in proposing this debate, and I believed it without any credible supporting evidence.

         In either case, my “imperative” was a “true” reflection of how I felt, but there was more truth to be mined from beneath my words. This is exactly the way that most Biblical revelation is meant to function, especially in the case of a book like James. The “truth” behind God’s speech-acts is often incomplete until we respond to what we “feel” from the Word—and what the Spirit speaks into our consciences—when we hear/read it (this is IMO exactly what John is talking about in 1 Jn 3:18-23).

         The next seven paragraphs, beginning with “Excessive rationalist use of…”:
         Fred, you changed my words and completely misconstrued what I meant. There is a huge difference between [ir]rational and rationalistic. A “rationalistic” use of logic or language has nothing to do with the quantity of the words or logic. (At least two “companion” comments have complained that I use too many words and lots of “evasive logic,” but no one I know would accuse me of being “excessively rationalistic”.) The phrase “excessively rationalistic” simply refers to arguing a point by relying too much on rationalism as one’s form of logic (cf. also “logical positivism”).

         Third-to-last para. (beginning “If you deny…”):
         Again, I am not denying logic and language as “adequate” for God to convey truth. My commentary on Job and Ecclesiastes and the paper I sent you that outlines my epistemic approach makes this very clear, in reduce every major thought unit to a 3-part proposition in order to describe and distinguish the three components of the speech-act(s) that comprise(s) each. But that statement is not the same as the revelation itself, which is meant to “do things” to you that my proposition could not “do” without letting the text “hit” you. Logic and language are absolutely critical to the interpretation of Job and Ecclesiastes, but few people “get” the intended truth because they resist being impacted in the non-propositional ways intended.

         The remainder of your response, including the PS:
         OK, here is an example like you asked for:
         There are two adjacent Proverbs you know very well, and neither of them is framed in the form of a proposition (as I have defined it).
         Speak to a fool according to his folly…”
         Do not speak to a fool according to his folly…”
         OK, Fred, are these two Proverbs “true”?
         Someone might well say, “Cheater, cheater, pumpkin eater…” because I didn’t qualify the two apodoses with their respective protases and finish the statements. But that wouldn’t really allow one to answer my question, would it? Do you “believe” the two proverbs? (Category mistake; they are not propositions.) Are they true? Ah, that’s a valid question. My answer would be “They are true whenever the shoe fits.” IOW, one has to exercise moral discernment to know on the basis of the fool’s motivation whether it is “truly appropriate” to speak to that fool, because he is on the verge of “becoming wise in his own eyes.”

         OTOH, depending on one’s “track record” in “answering” this same fool, it may become clear that one is on the verge of responding out of a desire for vengeance, rather than for true wisdom to prevail. It may no longer be possible to elicit any further wisdom from the conversation because of the “many useless words” (Eccl. 5:3; 10:12-14), and to do so only “multiplies words,” so that “you become like him.”

         My point is this: There is obviously deep, deep truth in both of these (non-propositional) Proverbs taken together, but it makes no sense to ask whether we “believe” them or not; and without moral discernment in response to a given presenting situation, it is useless to try to determine which truth applies to the situation. I think that most of Scripture is revealed in just this way, so our capacity for understanding is limited by the extent to which we exercise moral discernment (Heb 5:13-14). Propositions contain truth, but they also (and perhaps, even, most often) are meant to help point the way to deeper truth.

3. Jim,

   I’ll get back to you on the notion about biblical revelation being both propositional and non-propositional, but I want to really echo your thought about the arguments being “provisional”—I want to engage in a conversation. This doesn’t mean I won’t be dogmatic at some point, but I agree with you that we are thinking about this together.

   I know some accuse me of having an agenda in the shadows…but it isn’t in the shadows at all. I just want the truth. If I like yours better than mine, I’ll take it! If I don’t like yours—I’ll soon know why I now really, really, like mine!

   Of course, logic notwithstanding, the Word of God is the final say.

   Grace,

   Fred

4. Fair enough, Fred. I’m not sure it’s as clear-cut as accepting one “side” or the other. From my vantage, the biggest obstacles are epistemological, as will hopefully begin to crystallize in my continuing, multi-part response to your initial reply.

   (Part two) This is another critical area of contrary understanding and perhaps even disagreement. In response to my contention that “you can’t boil faith down to ‘knowability’ or ‘persuasion’ alone,” you said (again, my rejoinders in bold font):

   Why not? How do you draw a distinction between believing I’m saved and believing I accepted salvation? Your statement of ‘acceptance’ is just a proposition you believe to be true; isn’t it? Did you accept it or believe it? Accept can mean ‘to receive willingly’ or ‘to recognize as true’ (from here on out I’m referencing Webster’s unless otherwise noted).
   Your question misconstrues the distinction I am proposing. The distinction you are “hearing” me say reduces the “transaction” to cognition alone. That’s what I mean by invoking the need for “volition.” What I am asserting is a distinction between a willingness to accept an offer (= trusting the one making the offer for what he is promising) and knowing/being persuaded of the claims that make the offer a valid one (= “basis of salvation”). When I use the term “accept,” I am only taking the first Webster definition you provided, “willingly receive.” One doesn’t merely cognitively “believe” Jesus’ offer of eternal life, one accepts it, or not; what is cognitively “believed” is the proposed basis or means by which that offer can be made good.

   Volition-in-faith seems to me to be a bit dependent on an assumption that conscious volition is a necessary step in believing (seems like a circular argument); an assumption that really needs to be proved for me to believe it. People believe things all the time ‘in an instant’ without engaging any choice at all (or we at least can’t measure the choice to believe)…in fact, that is the very nature of deception (1 Tim 2:14). How we come to believe something is one of the great theological/philosophical mysteries…but what believing means is not…it is persuasion, being convinced of something (a proposition), coming to a conclusion [“By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac, and he who had received the promises offered up his only begotten son, of whom it was said, “In Isaac your seed shall be called,” concluding that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead, from which he also received him in a figurative sense.” (Hebrews 11:17-19, NKJV) ].
   No, Fred, that is not what I’m claiming at all. Volition doesn’t even have to be conscious; the only thing someone may consciously realize when they have exercised the volition I’m talking about is an immediate sense of assurance or relief or “rest” or confidence or unmitigated joy to replace despair, fear, uncertainty, anxiety, etc. The Hebrews citation illustrates the distinction (though it is an illustration of the sanctification dynamics of faith): Abraham had already “received” (the Greek is rare = anadechomai) the promises, which I believe signifies the “volition” component was already laid down. If Abraham had only passively “received” the promises, it is entirely possible that the un-prefixed dechomai would have been used. My point is that Abraham had already appropriated the covenant promise of “Seed” (Gen 12, 15, 17, etc.) before his faith was tested by whether he was persuaded of the truth claim of God’s “resurrecting capacity.” IOW, for Abraham to live sacrificially in the present by his previously demonstrated faith, he would have to be “convinced” of God’s power to raise the dead. (BTW, that I believe is the main thrust of 1 Cor 15.) The component of volition had already been established (whether he was “aware” or not, he had accepted the promise of “seed forever”), so that he was now willing to sacrifice his son once he was persuaded of his son’s “resurrectability.”

   On volition, by the way, there is more to think about. If I can choose to ‘accept’ something to be true, then I can choose to accept anything to be true. Yet, I really can’t choose to believe anything. I can’t choose to believe I’m a woman, tall, a closet Hindu, etc. I simply believe other things, I’m persuaded.
   Same problem, Fred, as Greg well established in his exchange with Kev on the prior thread . . . this is a category mistake. We’re not talking about “choosing to accept anything to be true,” which as you point out is circular. Again, the question of volition is distinct from being persuaded; it has to do with accepting an offer/promise—not a truth claim, as I established in my previous post.

   Also, I do not understand how Romans 5:17 demonstrates that faith involves the will…?
   Excellent . . . no crucial . . . question. There has been an ongoing debate in FG circles about what it means to “accept Jesus” (or whether that even makes sense, soteriologically speaking), based on Scriptures like John 1:12 and Rev 3:20. The two clauses in John 1:12—“to as many as receive Him”; and “to those who believe in His name”—are in apposition (meaning grammatically equivalent), so whatever John means by “believe” is at least in part embodied in the concept of “receive” (Greek here = lambanw, to actively “take” or “appropriate to oneself”—equivalent IMO to anadechomai in Heb 11:17). The same verb is used in Romans 5:17 to express the idea of actively appropriating grace through faith in order to receive “life.” My contention is that both Paul and John are underscoring the volitional component of “faithing” as critical for the result “justification of life” (Paul, 5:18) or “become children of God” (John 1:12), which IMO are different facets of “life after death, forever.” Along these same lines, then, an otherwise potentially embarrassing “proposition” like 1 John 5:11-12 makes all the sense in the world. That is, to “have” (possess?) the Son has already been defined by John and clarified by Paul as “receiving” (actively appropriating to oneself) the gift of grace (the atoning death and resurrection of the Person = “means”) that “delivers” eternal life.

   I will post another couple of responses separately to answer the rest of your arguments, Fred; some will be redundant, but there are still crucial points to be made about the scope of meaning entailed in pisteuw and whether “belief” in the cross is necessary for salvation.

5. (Part Three, responding to your take on my “three component” distinction)

   the “transaction” involves an object of faith, which is the Person of Messiah
   At times the text says believe in Him and at times the text says believe that _________. I’m not sure the ‘object’ of faith really holds up compared to ‘propositions’ to believe. Frankly, how would you know that He is the Messiah (or what that means) without believing a variety of propositions FIRST?
   I agree with you, actually. In these contexts—in which propositions are delineated as hoti clause complements of the verb pisteuw—the objects of belief are indeed propositions. These examples address the need of people who are willing to receive the gift but don’t know the Person well enough or they need to know more about the means in order to trust the Person for his offer of eternal life. Under these contextually specific circumstances, those who believe the proposition(s) will simultaneously trust the Person for the promise and are thus already “saved.” Different (willing) people may need to be persuaded of different propositions in order to trust the Person, which Gordon Clark recognized and thus understood implicitly that he had to “punt” on specifying the “content.” But, if someone is not willing to receive the gift, it doesn’t matter how much you predicate about that Person (propositionally), they will not receive the gift even if they concede the truth of these “knowable” propositions. This “concession” would not be Biblical “belief,” because they have not trusted the Person to appropriate the gift to themselves.

   Indeed, what you say here about an ‘object of faith’ is actually a proposition, which I don’t yet believe. Yet, if you believe all the propositions, then you also believe in the object.
   I’m not sure I disagree, but I would restate it differently: “If you believe/trust all the propositions, then you are already willing to receive the gift and already believe/trust in the Person to deliver that gift.” By the same token, however, if one is not willing to accept the gift, they can concede the truth of any number of propositions yet never appropriate the gift to themselves, thereby entrusting their eternal destiny to the Giver. I know people who have conceded “I agree that Jesus died and rose again, but it’s not for me, because I want to do life my own way.” Again, this “concession” of the reality of Jesus’ death and resurrection is not Biblical belief—they have not appropriated to themselves the promise of eternal life in Christ that is accomplished by these “means.”

   a basis for salvation, which is the death and Resurrection of that Person.
   Just because it is a (the?) basis, why does that mean it cannot be the means of salvation as well?
   Yes, it is the “means” = “basis” of salvation.
   We are saved by faith in something (propositions / object / person / promise…which is a proposition). Saying it is a basis, while true, doesn’t explain why it is not also the actual ‘object’ of faith that results in our salvation.
   No, here is where I disagree. A promise is not the same as a proposition. If the person is not willing to receive a gift, the promise of that gift is still of no consequence, even if the Giver backs up that promise with a “believable” (hoti clause) proposition. If I am willing to receive the gift, and the One who offers is trustworthy because of his prior track record (of delivering life after death, forever, to those who believe), then I trust Him to deliver on His promise by whatever means. If I don’t yet trust Him to deliver, I will need to be convinced; even if I am willing, if I think the means that he proposes to deliver me are absurd because I am a pure naturalist and remain totally unconvinced of the power of death and resurrection, then it doesn’t matter how much I want eternal life, I won’t trust Him to deliver me. But if I concede His supernatural power (to deliver life after death, forever) because of His testimony or “track record” (compare, e.g., the Passover and the Exodus) and am willing to accept the gift, then I need only trust Him alone as the agent who can deliver me with whatever instrumental means are at His disposal. If I concede His supernatural power, but could care less because I’m not yet done trying to make my own life work in order to secure my eternal destiny (which could be nothing more than a “legacy” to be proud of), then it doesn’t matter at all whether I concede that He has the power to do it, because I am not willing to “receive” Him or His gift (cf. John 1:12; 5:35-40; Rom 5:17). These varying dynamics in context are played out in narrative form all the way from John 2:23 through chap. 12.

   a result, which is “eternal life.”
   While this is true as to the result of saving faith, it is clearly not the only expression of what the result of saving faith is called. For example, the result of saving faith is also salvation. Saved from what? Guilt? Sin? An eternity apart from God? If ‘eternal life’ is accepted as the only expression of the result of saving faith, then the arguments are unfairly (in my opinion) and narrowly focused on passages with that term in it.
   There is an exhausting number of passages that mention these things and more. Mark 3:29 says, “”but he who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is subject to eternal condemnation”—” (Mark 3:29, NKJV) or “but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin”—” (Mark 3:29, ESV) It is unavoidable that forgiveness is the basis for an eternal acceptance; so, it seems to stand to reason that we may just as rightly speak of forgiveness as the result or outcome of our faith…and, the saving of our souls (1 Peter 1:9) as a fine description of the story.
   My position is that there are multiple levels of salvation in the life of a Christian, and all of these come under the umbrella of “eternal life.” Which “salvation” is in view in the multiple passages to which you allude depends obviously on context, as I know you have said yourself. Similarly, there are several levels of forgiveness on the basis of atonement for sin in our lives in Christ (which was the topic of my recent GES paper on Rom 5:12-21); Romans 5-8 helps me immensely to understand how the death and Resurrection has (or should have) continuing efficacy in our lives (to “reign in righteousness to eternal life,” 5:21). This latter point, to my way of thinking, is what has been completely “lost in the shuffle” of these ongoing FG debates over soteriological nuances. I’m not claiming these nuances are unimportant; but the debates have all but completely stymied the badly needed growth of a more full-orbed FG theology, not to mention personal reconciliation within the Body of Christ.

6. (Part Four) in reply to your response to my summary:

   So when I think of “saving faith” I think of trusting in an object (the promised Messiah) for a result (life after death, forever). The basis by which that promise can be guaranteed is the atoning death and resurrection of the Son of God.

   I appreciate these propositions that you believe, however, it appears you think the basis of your belief is superfluous. If this is true, it does sort of put you in the position of believing the cross is an unnecessary (but useful if known) bit of information. And, that whether or not one knows the ‘basis by which that promise is guaranteed’ (the death and resurrection as you describe) doesn’t matter as long as he believes the promise.

   Here is where we probably have the most work to do—the concerns you express here are legitimate and exemplify why it is so important to distinguish the volitional and cognitive (i.e., “content-oriented”) components of the “transaction” that we’re calling salvation.

   “Knowledge” or “awareness” of the basis of salvation is not at all superfluous in my view. “The cross” is a metonymy for the shed blood of a human Ransom offered to redeem captive humans from the penalty of sin = death (Heb 2:14-18). This a basic definition of atonement, which to my view is more properly thought of as a “gift to be received” than a “proposition to be believed.” The notion of atonement as a gift to be received is as old as Genesis 3:15-24, and it is repeatedly pictured in both narrative and propositional form throughout the OT. The available “content” or “detail” of that atonement in the form of divinely revealed propositions or narrative “pictures” has progressively increased from the time of our first “parents” to the Cross and Resurrection.

   However, even the primitive form of the gospel in Gen 3:15, 20-21 reveals all three basic components of the saving “transaction”: YHWH, speaking to the serpent, promises a future human “seed” of the woman (= “object” of faith) who will crush the “author” of Death but “take a hit to the heel” in the process (= “basis” of salvation) in order to make life after death possible (= “result” promised). The “death” consequences of sin are then delineated (3:16-19, 22-24) but faith is also depicted in narrative fashion in Adam’s naming of the mother of the saving “seed” (3:20) with the ransom graphically depicted in the blood sacrifice of an animal to “cover their nakedness [= sin]” (3:21).

   My point in going through all this is that anyone who knew the story of Gen 3 would have at least a vague “awareness” of the notion of atonement as part and parcel of the offer of life after death. The “content” of this atonement is not superfluous for two reasons: 1) It specifies the identity of the ransomed Seed; and 2) it warrants the reliability of the promise of life in that Seed by specifying the nature of the gift to be received, so that anyone who trusts in the promise of life can confidently release their “death grip” on whatever else they may be trusting for “life after death.”

   A most astonishing and fully propositional description of this ransom-based atonement is revealed to Job by his inspired friend Elihu in Job 33:14-30 (the exegesis for which can be found in my commentary). In that passage, it is clear that God fully intends to offer, repeatedly, rescue from death if man will only “listen.” Elihu therefore ends his gospel message by imploring Job to listen, which implies “accepting” the offered “rescue.” Hence, implicit in Elihu’s gospel message are all three “components” of the transaction: 1) a unique “messenger” who promises to rescue man from the Pit (= “object” of faith); 2) a “ransom” that delivers man from the Pit (= “means” of salvation); and 3)the promise of “revitalization” or “life after death.” If you read Job 33:23-28 from this perspective, these three components of Elihu’s gospel should literally jump off the page. Perhaps even more astonishing is the fact that even though Job is initially portrayed as “blameless and upright,” he still needs temporal deliverance from sin, and this still requires atonement and is no less part of the “gospel.”

   The same components of the “transaction” are depicted in the Levitical ceremonies of atonement and the remarkable portrait of the Suffering Servant in Isa 52-53. In sum, the “gospel” has always included all three components and it still should. As to “content,” this depends on the particular dispensation in which the gospel message is revealed; but if we understand “Cross” as a metonymy for a specified efficacious ransom, then this “gospel” notion has been potentially available to be heard by humans in all dispensations. Humans are responsible for “listening” to the offer and “receiving” the gift in order to be saved; as to “content,” they are only accountable for the “light received.”

   OK, Fred, if we can get through all that and come to some “least common denominator” of understanding, then we can talk about how Cross and Resurrection “fit” in the gospel today.

Comments are closed.